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 1. Introduction	
 
How can the law be characterized in a theory of collective intentionality that treats collective 
intentionality as essentially layered and tries to understand these layers in terms of the structure 
and the format of the representations involved? And can such a theory of collective 
intentionality open up new perspectives on the law and shed new light on traditional questions 
of legal philosophy? As a philosopher of collective intentionality who is new to legal philosophy, 
I want to begin exploring these questions in this paper. I will try to characterize the law in terms 
of the layered account of collective intentionality that I have introduced in some earlier writings 
(Schmitz 2013; 2018). In the light of this account I will then discuss a traditional question in the 
philosophy of law: the relation between law and morality. 
 I begin by giving a brief sketch of the layered account in the next section. Collective 
intentionality should be understood in terms of experiencing and representing others as co-
subjects, rather than as objects, of intentional states and acts on different layers or levels. I 
distinguish the nonconceptual layer of the joint sensory-motor-emotional intentionality of joint 
attention and joint bodily action, the conceptual level of shared we-mode beliefs, intentions, 
obligations, values, and so on, and the institutional level characterized through role 
differentiation, positions taken in role-mode, e.g. as a judge or attorney, and writing and other 
forms of documentation. In the third section I introduce a set of parameters for representations 
such as their degree of richness, of context-dependence, of density and differentiation of 
representational role and of durability and stability, which can be used to more precisely 
distinguish different layers. I also put forward the hypothesis that these properties are connected 
and tend to cluster, and that higher levels can only function and determine conditions of 
satisfaction against lower level ones. In the fourth and final section I critically discuss the sharp 
positivistic separation of morality and the law according to which whether something is a law is 
completely independent of its moral merits. I argue that this only seems plausible if we take an 
observational stance towards the law, but not towards morality. When we treat them the same 
way, it rather appears that the moral attitudes of the co-subjects of a society will determine 
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whether and to what extent they will accept its legal order. I conclude by proposing to think of 
the law as being itself an institutionalized form of morality. 2. Layers	of	collective	intentionality		
 
Let me use a toy example to illustrate the idea of different layers of collective intentionality. 
Imagine some kids who evolve a game, a practice of kicking a ball around. Let us further 
imagine, a bit, but hopefully not too artificially, that this only happens at what I will call the 
“sensory-motor-emotional” level or layer, without yet involving concepts and language. They 
kick the ball around and respond to each other’s kicking emotionally. In this way the point of the 
game – if there is such a thing – can be established in their joint interactions, and also what are 
good and admirable moves, what are rude ones, and so on. Of course, the game can only be 
roughly delineated in this way. Many things will remain indeterminate. But the players may still 
develop some sense of what they should do and what not. However, they may still be unable to 
conceptualize this sense, or may in any case not have done so yet. They may not think, they may 
not reflect about the game yet. And so their sense of what’s right or wrong in the game may 
remain tied to the context of actually playing it. 
Their understanding of the game and its normativity takes place on the pre-conceptual level. 
I think we should also take seriously the fact that they have not yet formulated rules for the 
game. Philosophers (and linguists, psychologists and others) often tend to take for granted that 
rules would have to be involved in such scenarios, especially when we speak of normativity. 
Terminologically of course it is quite sensible to assume that normativity should involve the 
presence of rules. But it is said too easily that rules are being followed “implicitly” and 
“unconsciously” when they have not yet been formulated. This is at best handwaving: it says that 
what is going on is in some way like what is going on when rules are being followed, but it does 
not tell us in which way. Worse yet, talk of unconscious rule following can suggest that we can 
just subtract consciousness from rules, but leave their intentionality (and causality) unchanged. 
And it may tempt us to disregard what is actually going on in consciousness at this level of social 
interaction – our sensory-motor-emotional experience. We often just operate on a sense of what 
is right or wrong which is manifest in this experience: in our perceptual experience of what 
others are doing, and our actional and emotional experience of our responses to it. We sense that 
something is right or wrong, but are often unable to articulate a relevant rule and to 
conceptualize the situation. I emphasize this because there is a deep-seated tendency in 
philosophy, but also in psychology, cognitive science and common sense, to conflate the 
conscious with the conceptual and therefore to disregard non-conceptual forms of 
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consciousness (for more discussion see Schmitz 2013; 2011). 
In light of this we may want to reserve the term “normativity” for competencies that involve 
the actual use of rules and instead use the term “protonormativity” at the sensory-motor-
emotional level. What is crucial though is that, first, even at this level already action-guiding 
representational states such as having a sense of what’s right or appropriate are in play, and that, 
second, such states may also have a social and collective dimension. Again, this dimension need 
not and at this level does not come in through conceptualization. At this level it is just manifest 
in that we experience others as co-subjects, as members of our group, and that this experience 
brings with it or triggers dispositions for joint action and a sense of how things are done in this 
group. We often operate on the basis of such a sense of what is appropriate in certain groups, 
but not others. There is a sense of how we do various things for various we’s. For example, Alex 
may play with the ball differently when he plays with Harry and Peter than when he plays with 
Tom and Terence because these groups have evolved different games. (Of course, this is not to 
deny the importance of exchange between groups, often mediated through individuals who are 
members in both.) Experimental data show that from an early age, children are sensitive to the 
different normative constraint imposed by different co-subjects of joint action. The very same 
objective stimulus can trigger different action schemata when it comes from different co-
subjects, depending on which if any joint activity the co-subjects have been engaged in. For 
example, in a study by Liebal et al. (2009) one-year old infants, who had been cleaning toys into a 
basket with an adult, put a toy into the basket when this adult pointed at it. But when a different 
adult performed the same pointing action, they mostly just handed the toy to him (see also 
Tomasello (2014, 55) and (Schmitz 2016) for discussion). 
At the next level, patterns and practices are conceptualized and become the object of 
deliberation, of debate, thought and reflection. Various relevant concepts such as “goal”, “free 
kick”, “penalty”, “penalty box”, “offside” and so on, will be introduced, and rules will be 
formulated and negotiated. A name for the game may likewise be introduced, and perhaps 
various versions of it may begin to be distinguished, as we now distinguish football – what 
Americans call “soccer” – from American and Australian football. This also means that the co-
subjects of these versions – the people who play by their rules – can be identified conceptually 
– as “footballers” – and not just in the immediate context of joint action, as we just imagined. 
Relevant concepts also include concepts for various roles within the game – “goalie”, 
“midfielder”, “striker” etc., but also “referee”. Such concepts will reflect a prior specialization or 
role differentiation, but they will also tend to promote and further such role differentiation as 
e.g. when teams are asked who their striker or midfielder is. 
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One important function of concepts is that they allow us to anticipate scenarios that haven’t 
yet been encountered in practice. In fact, concepts almost force us into this, through the 
generality of thought that they bring with them and the fact that they tend to be parts of whole 
systems of concepts. In this way, conceptual thinking is very conducive to creating a whole 
system of rules for a game that is formulated in terms of interlocking concepts. 
So far, I am assuming that we are talking about concepts and rules as passed on in the oral 
tradition. Another important step occurs when people start to write down rules. This makes it 
possible for the rules to be much more stable and to be distributed more widely. It is also an 
important amplifier of the power of conceptual thought. Writing the rules down makes it much 
easier to systematize them and to make them consistent. 
Codifying the rules is not the only important function enabled by writing. Writing also makes 
various forms of documentation possible: e.g. the referee may be required to write and sign a 
report of the game; a team to list its players, who in turn may have to be licensed by the league in 
which they are playing or by some other supervisory body. The committees who run these 
bodies will document their meetings and the status of its members. The incredibly rich and 
elaborated institutional structure that we find in contemporary sports organizations such as, for 
example, the international football body FIFA, is certainly inconceivable without writing and 
other forms of documentation. 
Given this rough sketch of an example of different layers of collective intentionality, where 
should we say that the law begins here? I’ve used this example so that certain patterns become 
discernible without immediately bringing in charged questions associated with central instances 
of the law and its application. For purposes of this question, our example can be taken in a 
straightforward and literal as well as in a more metaphorical sense. That is, we may ask: “where 
does sports law begin?”. But we may also ask: “if we find an example of collective intentionality 
of a structure analogous to what I have described as our second layer, the layer where concept 
application begins, but in a domain, which is a central domain for the application of legal 
structures such as, for example, the domain of marriage, would we think of this as sufficient for 
the existence of a legal system?” That is, if a society has certain concepts concerning marriage 
and a more or less elaborate system of corresponding rules, some of which may be connected to 
sanctions, and this system is passed on in the oral tradition and functions in the context of and 
against the background of the customs, traditions and practices of a people, should we say then 
that they have a proper legal system concerning marriage? 
If we go by the first interpretation of our question, I suppose the answer is that we would 
speak of sports law only in the context of an elaborate system of sports bodies that certainly 
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requires writing and other forms of documentation. And some philosophers such as Maurizio 
Ferraris (2015) have taken a general position in the theory of institutional reality – of which the 
law certainly is a prime example – according to which institutional reality and even collective 
intentionality in general depend on documentation. On such a view a legal system would also 
generally require documentation. 
Such a view seems rather radical though. There certainly appear to be e.g. practices of 
treating something as somebody’s property which do not require written documentation of 
property and perhaps not even a concept of property. Common law marriage would also seem to 
provide a counterexample. Common law marriages are legally recognized in some jurisdictions 
without a marriage ceremony and written documentation, solely on the basis of having lived 
together for a specified amount of time and presenting as man and wife – same-sex relationships 
are not recognized as common law marriages. Presenting as such surely includes referring to 
themselves as such with relevant concepts. Similarly, the Gender Recognition Act in the UK 
enables the legal recognition of the gender of transgender people who have lived in this gender 
for at least two years and who present themselves accordingly. 
One might still try to argue that only the recognition by the authorities of the marriage or 
gender – which does involve documentation – is a proper legal act. But the claim that a proper 
legal system requires writing and documentation would be counter to the practice e.g. in 
anthropology where legal systems are ascribed to many preliterate societies. My aim here though 
is not to decide this kind of issue and defend a specific definition of the notion of “law”. I 
believe the boundaries of this concept could be legitimately drawn more narrowly or more 
widely depending on what one is interested in. My purpose is rather to situate the law in a theory 
of layers of collective intentionality and to argue that key parameters which can be used to 
identify such layers in the theory of intentionality and intentional content can also be used to 
identify the dimensions which are crucial for questions of this kind. That is, I want to show that 
wherever one may want to draw the line between morality and a legal system, properties of this 
kind are crucial. Moreover, such properties cannot only be used to define a boundary between 
legal systems and morality, they can also be used to determine how elaborate and advanced a 
legal system is. Before I come to this, however, I need to say a bit more about the structure of 
collective intentionality on these different layers. 
I believe the key to understanding collective intentionality is in terms of co-subjects jointly 
taking theoretical and practical positions towards the world in a self-aware way (Schmitz 2018). 
This happens on different layers of collective intentionality which correspond to the three layers 
I roughly distinguished in the football example. 
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1. The level of the mode of joint attention and joint (bodily) action. On this level the 
intentionality of co-subjects is non-conceptual sensory-motor-emotional intentionality. They 
non-conceptually experience themselves as jointly attending to objects in the world and acting on 
them. They also experience different kinds of emotional bonds that connect them. I believe that 
jointness on this and other layers necessarily includes at least a disposition for joint action. That 
is, what makes joint attention joint cannot be understood in terms of perceptual states and 
dispositions alone, as some philosophers have tried. Otherwise it cannot be distinguished from 
mutual observation (see Schmitz 2015 for discussion).  There must be an emotional bond, 
however transient, involved in sharing, which disposes the co-subjects to seek, maintain and re-
establish joint attention. Moreover, joint attention is typically geared towards joint action, for 
which it is an essential prerequisite.  
2. The we-mode level of joint intention, shared belief and other conceptual level intentional 
states. In the we-mode, co-subjects represent states of affairs and other objects in the world 
from a position of identification with a group and its ethos. The we-mode is best seen as a 
further modification of an I-consciousness, the modification where this I represents the world 
from the perspective of a we-subject, in a mode of identification with it. It’s important that 
sometimes positions I take in such a mode of identification with the group may differ from 
positions I take for myself, as a private person. It’s further important that we-mode intentionality 
can misrepresent. For example, I may be in a mode of we-intending, but if my supposed co-
subject has in the meantime abandoned our shared plan, I represent a joint position which does 
not exist anymore. 
3. The institutional level, where individuals and groups take positions in what I call “role-
mode”, that is, for example, as a judge or as a committee, and at crucial junctures, in a written or 
otherwise documented form, or at least in a context which essentially employs documentation. 
“Institution” is here taken in the narrower sense where it refers to an organization. Like we-
mode intentionality, role-mode intentionality should be seen as a further modification of I-
intentionality, respectively of both I-and we-intentionality, as in such cases as when a we-subject 
makes a decision in its role as a committee. In such a case, an I-subject represents the world 
from a perspective of a we that in turn takes up the perspective of a body, which represents the 
world from a perspective informed by the role of this body in the organization of which it is 
part. Again, it is crucial that the positions co-subjects take in their roles can be different from the 
positions they take or would take in different roles or as private people. For example, a judge 
may acquit somebody she privately thinks is guilty, and a politician may sometimes take a 
different position as leader of her party than as chancellor of her country. 
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To briefly address an objection1: it is true that people already take role-specific positions 
below the level of institutional reality, where these roles are either merely conceptually or even 
non-conceptually constituted and represented. For example, a mother will respond to her child 
as a mother on the basis of a role-specific emotional bond and / or role-specific conceptual level 
expectations and prescriptions. But it seems to me that the combination of increasing role 
differentiation and writing / documentation is an especially potent one that justifies thinking of 
them as being jointly characteristic for the level of institutional reality, and in the next section 
some reasons why this may be so will emerge. In any case, as I emphasized earlier, the tripartite 
distinction is more for purposes of rough orientation. More precise characterizations are possible 
with the help of the parameters / dimensions that I will now introduce. Some of these 
dimensions I have taken from the literature on nonconceptual content (e.g. Gunther 2003). So, I 
will sometimes begin with examples from their original domain and then present examples from 
the domain of collective intentionality in general and the law in particular. 
 3. Criteria	for	distinguishing	layers	
 
I will begin by introducing the following dimensions / parameters: 
 
a) richness of content / from concrete to abstract 
b) degree of context dependence 
c) density / gestaltlike character / differentiation of representational role 
d) degree of durability / stability / externalization / standardization 
 
I will then go on to explore some hypotheses concerning relations between these criteria and 
between layers. 
 
A) Richness of content / concrete to abstract 
 
In the perceptual and actional domain, think about the richness of experience and the fineness of 
grain in perceptually discriminating shades of red vs. conceptualizing them, or the richness and 
fineness of grain in experiencing dance movements vs. the conceptual level instructions given by 
your dance teacher. For the application to collective intentionality and the law, think about the 
                                                             
1 Thanks to Judith Martens for pressing this objection on several occasions. 
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richness of experiencing an emotional bond vs. conceptual and institutional representations of 
this bond. For example, think about experiencing one’s mother (as one’s mother) in immediate 
emotional interaction vs. applying the concept “mother” to her (which will be partially shaped 
through the larger culture one is part of) vs. an official documenting her legal status as your 
mother in a family registry, or about the emotional reaction to a crime and its perpetrator vs. its 
representation in the legal language of a court.  
 
B) Degree of context-dependence 
 
Richness and efficacy of content often (causally) depends on presence of object or co-subject. 
The full richness of the experience of, say, the colors of a sunset may only be possible in the 
immediate presence of this sunset, not through memory, though imagination may come close. In 
CI, many co-subjective relationships depend on face-to-face, sensory-motor-emotional for their 
establishment and maintenance. Other relationships feel more abstract and official, like for 
example, most encounters with law enforcement. To maintain relationships with a higher degree 
of context dependence requires conceptual or even documental forms of representation. For 
example, the police officer will have an ID as well as other markers of their status such as a 
uniform, and the population will have a conceptual understanding of what a police officer is and 
does. 
 Context has many dimensions and accordingly distance from the context and the degree of 
independence from it can mean many different things. For example, the degree of context 
independence may sometimes be fruitfully measured in terms of spatial and temporal distance 
from a perceptual context. In this way, animal psychologists have studied the context-
independence of an elephant’s ability to use tools. Would Kandula use a box to stand on to reach 
fruit in a tree, even if the box had been placed in a different section of the yard, out of view 
when the elephant was looking up at the tempting food? “Apart from a few large-brained 
species, such as humans, apes, and dolphins, not many mammals will do this, but Kandula did it 
without hesitation, fetching the box from great distances” (De Waal 2016, 16; based on Foerder 
et al. 2011). 
 When it comes to morality and the law, a crucial dimension of context-independence is the 
independence of the behavior of upholding norms and defending them against violators from 
emotional bonds, familial connections and immediate shared interests with the victim. Will I 
support somebody against a norm violation only when they are a family member, a friend, or a 
business partner, or will I also support a random person out of an abstract sense of justice and 
Schmitz / OF LAYERS AND LAWYERS / 9 
the allegiance to a much wider community of co-subjects such as a nation, humanity, or even all 
my conscious co-creatures? 
 
C) Density / gestaltlike character / representational role differentiation 
 
A simple example for the density or gestaltlike character of basic representations is the fact that 
in visual experience color and shape cannot be represented separately, though they can be 
separated at the conceptual level in thought. Similarly, in certain monkey warning calls 
theoretical, mind-to-world direction of fit aspects – “there is a leopard here!” – and practical, 
world-to-mind direction of fit ones – “Get on the trees!”– are not differentiated. Ruth Millikan, 
who calls such representations “pushmi-pullyu”-representations, mentions representations of the 
moral rules or customs of a society such as “No, Johnny, we don’t eat peas with our fingers 
here” as another example (Millikan 1995). As I shall discuss more extensively later, this also 
includes some representations of the laws of a society such as “The law says to drive on the left 
side of the road”. 
 Moreover, as has often been pointed out, in primitive societies the law itself is not yet 
differentiated from moral and religious notions. Jürgen Habermas describes such an elementary 
understanding of justice as follows: “The concept of justice lying at the basis of all forms of 
conflict resolution is intermingled with mythical interpretations of the world” (Habermas 1988, 
264). Habermas further characterizes the corresponding basic gestaltlike understanding of crime 
as follows: 
The severity of the crime is measured by the consequences of the act, not by the 
intentions of the perpetrator. A sanction has the sense of a compensation for resulting 
damages, not the punishment of someone guilty of violating a norm. This concretistic 
representation of justice does not yet permit a clear separation between legal questions 
and questions of fact. It seems that in those archaic legal processes, normative 
judgments, the prudent weighing of interests, and statements of fact are intertwined. 
(ibid., 265) 
So, at this level of understanding, the severity of the crime is not yet differentiated from the 
damage done. A more differentiated legal system does this by taking into account the 
perpetrator’s intentions, among other things. Such a system may also evolve a clear separation 
between a determination of the facts and the determination of their legal consequences, for 
example by assigning them to different phases of a trial. 
 This can also be seen as an instance of representational role differentiation. The most basic 
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form of representational role differentiation is the move from the continuous flow of sensory-
motor-emotional experience to the discontinuous propositional structure of language. Language 
comes in articulated units, sentences, and that is essentially connected to the fact that a sentence 
consists of elements such as verbs, nouns and adjectives, which have distinct representational 
roles within it. Such a differentiation of elements with distinct roles cannot yet be found in 
sensory-motor-emotional experience. The concept of representational role differentiation is wide 
and applies in many different contexts. To illustrate, the development of different text types such 
as, in the legal domain, briefs, opinions, and law review articles, is also an instance of 
representational role differentiation. 
 
D) Degree of durability / stability 
 
Conceptualization, documentation and institutionalization are all about making things more 
durable and stable so that one is able to manage disruptions and crises. They also enable 
integration with larger communities. For example, the relationship of a couple may first be solely 
or primarily based on their immediate sensory-motor-emotional interactions. Then they start to 
conceptualize it e.g. as love, which integrates it with the conceptual knowledge and expectations 
of their culture and make promises to each other. If they fight and want to break up, they might 
be told that there are ups and downs in any relationship. They might remind each other of their 
promises. If they get married, their relationship gets documented, certified by the institutional 
structures of the tribe, church or state, which will also tend to serve to protect it and make it 
more durable. 
 These functions are also enabled by the durability and stability of the relevant 
representational states, acts and artefacts. Written language and documentation are more durable 
and more easily repeatable and shareable than spoken language, which explains their importance 
for the process of institutionalization. 
 To these parameters let me add two more, which one would not ordinarily think of as 
being about representations, but which do essentially involve them and are essentially connected 
to the other parameters. The first is the differentiation of institutions themselves, e.g. the already 
mentioned separation of the legal sphere from morality and religion, or the differentiation of the 
legal sphere into sacred and secular law or criminal and civil law. The second is the attendant 
differentiation of institutional roles, which creates an ever increasing number of specialists. So 
instead of the mediators in some tribal societies we now have judges, attorneys, clerks, jurors, 
and so on. 
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 A central hypothesis of my version of a layered account is that the parameters described all 
tend to cluster and thus correlate with one another. Let me try to make this plausible with the 
following brief narrative. We first react to moral infractions in an immediate, context-dependent 
and concrete way, notably through emotionally charged responses such as so-called reactive 
attitudes (Strawson 1962). Such representations are also dense and gestaltlike, because they are 
responsive to many features, without separating and singling them out for attention. What upset 
me so much about this behavior, why did it seem such a betrayal? It may take a lot of reflection 
to conceptualize the situation – even assuming we already have relevant concepts at our disposal. 
When we do have appropriate moral concepts, the gathering of knowledge of instances, which 
may deviate from the central, prototypical ones in different ways and the striving for 
systematization will lead to further differentiation of our conceptual apparatus. For example, was 
as it theft, or robbery, homicide or murder? And once the legal sphere becomes more clearly 
separated from others and institutional roles are further differentiated, this will further accelerate 
conceptual development. More and more specialists can focus on it and will produce ever more 
abstract and elaborate conceptual frameworks. Documentation and writing make the legal order 
and legal statuses much more durable and context-independent and further enhance legal 
reflection, which is built through centuries through consideration and systematization of ever 
more cases, also leading through a proliferation of different forms of legal texts, thus increasing 
representational role differentiation. 
 It is a central assumption of a layered account that such diachronic phylogenetic structures 
are also reflected in the synchronic structure of the mind, mediated through the extent in which 
ontogeny recapitulates at least some stages of phylogeny. In trying to capture this layered 
structure, I think we need to strike a balance. On the one hand, layers are really separate from 
another, that is, they have a certain degree of autonomy. This is also necessary if they are to 
fulfill their function of creating order and stability and managing disruption and crises created at 
the lower, more volatile layers. (Recall our couple and their fight.) This is especially true for the 
law. On the other hand, higher layers also depend on lower ones. They can only function against 
the background of lower level capacities. To illustrate this dialectic of autonomy and 
dependence, consider what is usually called the belief independence of perception (Evans 1982), 
but which also might be called the autonomy of belief. I form the belief that the lines in the 
Müller-Lyer illusion are of equal length even though perceptually they persistently appear to 
differ in length. At the same time my capacity to form beliefs about the world and to think about 
it depends on my capacity to perceive it. Normally I accept the deliverances of my senses, and I 
can only ascribe illusions to myself on the basis of other perceptions – like when I take a ruler to 
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the Müller-Lyer lines (Schmitz 2019). And generally, my conceptual thoughts can only determine 
conditions of satisfaction against the background of lower-level, non-conceptual capacities 
(Schmitz 2012). 
 In the next and final section of this paper I will argue that this kind of relationship also 
holds between the legal system of a society and the moral attitudes of its members. The law has a 
certain degree of autonomy relative to these attitudes, but it is not completely independent of 
them either. Not every law will be consistent with the moral and other attitudes of all or even a 
majority of its members. Some laws are introduced against the will of a significant part of the 
population, others may lose the support of the people over the course of their existence because 
moral attitudes have changed. (One interesting manifestation of this is that laws will cease to be 
enforced and applied even though they remain on the books, like laws against sodomy and oral 
sex in some US states.) But it still remains true that the legal system of a society, like its 
institutional reality as a whole, depends on the acceptance of its members, and I think it is safe to 
assume that moral attitudes play an essential role in determining this acceptance. This will also be 
true regardless of where exactly we draw the line between morality and law. E.g. what degree of 
separation between the legal and religious sphere is required for us to speak of the legal system 
of a collective? As I said earlier, it is not obvious where this line should be drawn, but wherever 
we draw it, we will find that legal rules only function against the background of lower level 
attitudes. 
 Just like intentional states and acts in general, legal statutes also only determine conditions 
of satisfaction against the background of lower level capacities. To see this, consider the fact that 
they are often formulated using abstract concepts which cannot determine their conditions of 
application independently of common sense, including common sense moral attitudes. This 
point has been especially stressed by the tradition of legal realism, but it is also made by the great 
legal positivist H.L. Hart, who uses the example of a legal rule that forbids to take a vehicle into 
the public park: “Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy 
automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, as we say, to be called “vehicles” for the purpose 
of the rule or not?” (Hart 1958, 607). Or, we might add, what about scooters and the electric 
scooters that have recently become popular, but did not even exist when this rule was written? 
The law is typically written based on a gestaltlike apprehension of central cases, where many 
relevant properties cluster. But when we move to what Hart calls the “penumbra” of less central 
cases, these often can only be decided based on some understanding of what “the law ought to 
be” (ibid.: 608), and as Hart acknowledges, this means that uncodified, broadly moral 
considerations will be involved. 
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 What then are layers? Talking about layers of intentionality is a way of talking about 
relations between representational states, acts and artefacts such that higher level representations 
emerge later in phylogeny and ontogeny than lower level representations and depend on them 
for their functioning. However this dependence is holistic – not every belief is based on a 
perceptual state, though the capacity to form beliefs generally depends on perceptual capacities – 
and allows for a certain degree of autonomy, so that there can even be conflicts between layers, 
as when my belief overrides my perceptual experience, or my legal thinking in my role as a judge 
overrides my gut feeling, even my belief, that the defendant is guilty, and I still acquit her, say 
because the evidence that moves me personally is legally inadmissible. And as I have argued, the 
representations on different layers can be order in terms of degrees of such parameters as 
concreteness, context-dependence, density and representational role differentiation, and 
durability and stability.  4. The	law	as	institutionalized	morality	
 
So far, I have approached the issue of the relation between morality and law in what one might 
think of as a broadly naturalistic, perhaps even positivistic spirit. That is, I have looked at law as 
a social practice, and though I did not try to draw a sharp boundary, I have tried to describe 
(some of) the parameters which may turn a (merely) moral practice into a legal one, as when it 
gets further developed, differentiated, codified and enforced by specialists. I have also claimed 
though that higher-level representations such as legal ones can only function effectively and 
determine conditions of satisfactions against the background of lower-level ones such as moral 
attitudes. While, as we have noted, at least the last point is also accepted by a legal positivist such 
as Hart, the resulting picture seems to be in tension with the positivist account of the relation 
between morality and law. In this last section I therefore want to explore traditional issues about 
this relation further in light of the account of collective intentionality that I have sketched. As we 
shall see, not only the layered aspect will be important for this, but also the emphasis on the 
distinction between representing others as co-subjects vs. representing them as merely as objects. 
 I take the core claim of legal positivism to be that whether something is law does not depend 
on its merits – where by “merits” we mean moral merits – but on its sources, the social 
structures and processes that have originated it and maintain its existence, its being in force (e.g. 
Gardner 2001; Green and Adams 2019). Legal positivism rejects both the ideas of the natural law 
tradition that something could be law ‘naturally’, without a proper social, institutional context, 
and that something properly situated in such a context could fail to be law. So, whether 
something is part of the law is the question whether a certain social fact obtains. 
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Accordingly, when people express their opposition to certain prescriptions by saying that 
they are not, or not really, law, the positivist will think that they express this (typically morally 
motivated) opposition in a confused way. They are mixing up the question whether a certain 
social fact obtains with the question of whether it should obtain. So, they fail to properly 
separate law and morality. We have to recognize that – unfortunately – the law is not always just 
and morally right. 
This is certainly true, but does it establish the separation of law and morality that positivism 
requires? Obviously, this depends on what kind of separation positivism requires, and different 
philosophers will give different answers to that. I believe that we should not be transfixed by 
labels such as “positivism”. In what follows I will argue from the point of view of the layered 
account that law and morality still remain essentially connected. In fact, I will suggest that the 
best way to think of the law is as being itself an institutionalized form of morality (where 
morality is taken in a broad sense which includes mores, conventional ways of doing things). 
This view will combine positivist with not-so-positivist sounding claims, and I will leave it to the 
reader to decide how, if at all, it should be labelled. 
While it is often pointed out that laws can be immoral, the corresponding observation about 
morality is much less often made. That is, while it has become routine to acknowledge that laws 
can be unjust, the claim that morals can be immoral may still sound paradoxical to some. But just 
as I can criticize a law as unjust on the basis of moral ideas and even as illegal because it violates 
other laws, so I can criticize a moral code as immoral on the basis of my own, different moral 
code. Of course, when calling a person (or action) immoral, people sometimes mean that they 
are not sufficiently governed by a moral code, or even that they lack one entirely. However, the 
latter claim is hardly, if ever, true. It’s much more often the case that we are too outraged by 
moralities different from ours to even recognize and understand them as such. In our (genuine 
or faked) outrage, we fail to recognize the morality and thus the humanity of others. 
The reason I emphasize that moral codes can be criticized as immoral just as laws can be, is 
that we must be careful not to confound the distinction between morality and law with the 
distinction between two different perspectives that we can take towards both, namely the 
perspective of the observer or theoretician with the perspective of the participant or, to put it in 
the terms I have been using, the co-subject. When we consider the law as philosophers of law, 
we naturally take a theoretical perspective or position as observers. When we then judge, or 
imagine judging, a law to be immoral, it is tempting to do so from the point of view of one’s 
personal morality, or of one’s morality as a member, a co-subject of a group one identifies with, 
without taking a corresponding theoretical perspective on this morality. That is, while one 
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considers the law as an object of theoretical inquiry, a domain of social facts, morality is here 
construed subjectively in the sense that it is part of the apparatus with which we investigate this 
domain of facts, rather than as itself an object of inquiry. 
Taking this perspective, it seems obvious that the existence of laws and legal facts must be 
completely separate from their moral merits, because it is certainly independent of whether the 
theoretician morally approves of a law, legal act or legal system, especially when we consider the 
laws of societies far removed in space, time and moral outlook, as we will tend to in such 
contexts. But the real question of course is whether the existence of laws in a society can be 
independent of the moral attitudes of the members, the co-subjects, of that society. For example, 
the Jim Crow laws in the US existed even though we now regard them as profoundly immoral. 
But could they have been the law of the land at the time if the attitude of the population then 
had been as it is now? That already looks like a rather implausible claim. 
The corresponding general thesis in the philosophy of institutional reality is that institutional 
facts – of which legal facts are a species – are, as, John Searle put it in his seminal book The 
Construction of Social Reality (Searle 1995) observer- or belief-dependent or observer-relative, in 
contrast to ordinary facts, which of course are belief-independent. I think that Searle is right that 
institutional reality in general and legal reality is mind-dependent, that its existence depends on 
the collective acceptance of the society whose institutional reality it is. But we can’t think of 
acceptance here as a mere theoretical attitude, a belief that something is the case. If all members 
of a given society, including the legal officials, only had relevant beliefs about the relevant states 
of affairs, if they knew what the others were doing, what their roles are, who they had been 
appointed by, and so on, but were practically and morally indifferent or even hostile towards 
these arrangements, I don’t think we could say that these laws were really the legal system of that 
society. 
Acceptance in the relevant sense must include practical attitudes. To accept the order of a 
society, whether moral or legal, is not merely to have beliefs that people have certain roles etc. 
including even beliefs that others believe this as well: it must include a recognition of this order 
as legitimate and binding. And this in turn must mean at least some disposition to comply with 
that order, to defend it and to have other pro-attitudes such as approval towards it. Therefore, 
the collective attitudes that are constitutive of legal reality can’t only be attitudes of belief, at least 
if by belief we mean a purely theoretical, mind-to-world direction of fit attitude. (It is presumably 
for reasons of this kind that in his later work Searle often speaks of the intentionality- or 
participation-relativity of institutional reality rather than of its observer-relativity or belief-
dependence (e.g. 2010, 17).) 
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I suggest that a basic kind of attitude among those that are constitutive of legal reality are the 
already mentioned pushmi-pullyu representations, representational acts or states that essentially 
contain mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit aspects, though in an as yet not clearly 
differentiated form, like in Millikan’s example “No, Johnny, we don’t eat peas with our fingers 
here”. A typical utterance of a sentence like this is not a mere description of the customs of a 
group, but has prescriptive force. It’s a way of telling Johnny that he should not eat peas with his 
fingers either. “The law says that we must stop at the junction” will normally be meant and 
understood in just the same way. So, our basic way of relating to the law is one that 
acknowledges it as a reality, but at the same time recognizes it as something that has prescriptive 
force over our actions, with these two aspects not yet being clearly differentiated. The clear 
separation of description and prescription and thus the representation of legal facts as mere facts 
belongs to a higher level of understanding. This level is not as such constitutive of the existence 
of legal facts. It is rather a level on which we reflect on these facts as entities that exist 
independently of us as observers. But at that same level we also have to recognize that these 
facts do not exist independently of the attitudes of the co-subjects of this society, and that these 
attitudes have an irreducibly practical aspect, so that they represent the law not as a mere fact, 
but as somethings to be respected and followed, at least generally and under normal conditions. 
This way of accounting for institutional reality is importantly different from Searle’s 
superficially similar account in terms of his notion of a declaration, which (also) is supposed to 
have both directions of fit. The crucial difference is that on Searle’s account the declaration both 
makes it the case that a state of affairs is a fact and represents it as a fact. That is, the very same 
representational act is supposed to have world-to-mind and mind-to-world direction of fit with 
regard to the same state of affairs. But it is highly questionable whether the very same 
representation can both create a fact and represent it as being the case at the same time (cf. 
Laitinen 2014 for criticism). This idea is in tension with realism. In contrast, the Millikanian 
account more modestly only claims that pushmi-pullyu representations represent a state of 
affairs as having prescriptive force with regard to other states of affairs, respectively actions. 
There is nothing mysterious about that. It is grounded in the fact that we perceive situations so 
as to immediately mandate certain actions, in basic cases even without clearly differentiating 
description and prescription. It is also grounded in the well-known tendency of humans, 
especially children, to imitate the actions of their fellow creatures, in particular members of their 
own group and be guided by them. The respect for the law of one’s group is a higher-level 
manifestation of the same basic tendency, because the law is a codification, a more context-
independent way of representing ways of behaving that are to be imitated, respectively that are 
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prohibited. 
Another way of making what is essentially the same point is to say that groups exist in virtue 
of subjects identifying with the other group members, their co-subjects. Already at the sensory-
motor-emotional level this means, as argued earlier, that jointness cannot be reduced to 
perceiving the same things and being mutually aware of that, but must include an emotional 
identification with the other, imitative tendencies and at least a disposition for joint action. 
Analogously, at the conceptual level of we-mode intentionality, co-subjects must not only share 
beliefs and be aware of that, but must identify with what Raimo Tuomela calls the “group ethos” 
(e.g. Tuomela 2013). At the institutional level this means that being a member of communities 
ranging from tribes to nation-states or even supra-national units such as the EU requires a 
certain level of identification with these units and that also means an identification with their 
goals. This is not only, but particularly true for those who have official roles within those 
institutional contexts. For them, it means that the role-constituting intentionality I call “role 
mode”-intentionality cannot consist merely in beliefs about that institutional structure, the role 
one has been appointed to, and so on. There must be at least some degree of identification with 
the ethos and the goals of the relevant institution. In role mode, the subject takes theoretical and 
practical positions towards the world from the vantage point of the role, that is, shaped through 
the ethos of the organization and the function of the role within it.    
Of course, it is still possible that somebody takes up such a role who does not identify with it 
and its ethos – for example, think of a spy, who only pretends to. Similarly, obviously not all co-
subjects of a given collective will agree with all of its laws. We are here trying to explain the 
normal, proper functioning of laws and layers. As I have emphasized, these institutions are made 
for durability. They are generally able to survive laws and lawyers that do nothing or very little to 
promote justice and the common good. However, there will be a point where the institutional 
structure collapses, or is abandoned, when the disconnect between its rules and its officials and 
the moral and other attitudes of the rest of the population becomes too severe. The collapse of 
the East Bloc countries in the annus mirabilis 1989 is only one of the latest and most spectacular 
of many instances of this kind of phenomenon. Moreover, as we discussed, even in its normal 
functioning the law depends on moral thinking to determine its application to the penumbra of 
non-central cases. 
 While it is thus true that not all laws of a society have to agree with the outlook of all of its 
co-subjects, the existence of the legal system as a whole still depends on their acceptance. And 
this in turn means that it will depend on their moral attitudes, which will surely essentially 
contribute to determining this acceptance. I conclude that while the existence of a specific law or 
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other specific legal facts is independent of their moral merits in the eyes of a mere observer, this 
cannot be said of the existence of the legal system as a whole in relation to the members or co-
subjects of the relevant society. If these members cease to accept it, it will become idle and void 
and at same point will cease to be their law. Therefore, what the law of a society is, does 
ultimately depend on its moral merits in the eyes of the members of the society. 
Once we clarify that the dependence of the legal system on lower level moral attitudes is 
holistic, I confess that to me it seems to be sort of obvious – how could the acceptance of a legal 
order not at least also be shaped by moral concerns? But is there anything that we could say to 
convince a skeptic?2 First, to block a possible misunderstanding, let me emphasize that quite 
often people are mere objects of legal systems. For example, an occupying force may impose 
legal statuses on the occupied population. But as long as they do not accept the occupying force, 
they would not be co-subjects of the relevant society and thus not a counterexample to my 
claim. (Of course, precise boundaries between acceptance and mere domination are hard to 
draw, but this does not mean either that this distinction is not vital, or that acceptance is not 
morally motivated.) Second, the question of the acceptance of legal and institutional structure is 
a political question and we have a lot of evidence that political attitudes are connected with 
moral attitudes. For example, in the present political situation proponents of the social justice 
movement – which is obviously a morally motivated movement – will tend to sympathize with 
left-wing parties, while adherents of more traditional, religiously shaped forms of morality will 
tend to sympathize with right-wing parties. Jonathan Haidt (2012) has collected an impressive 
body of evidence that in the US Democrats and Republicans have importantly different moral 
outlooks along similar lines. 
It may be objected that this only shows that partisan politics are connected to moral outlook, 
while what we really need is evidence that moral outlook is connected to attitudes shared across 
party lines such as acceptance of the legal and institutional structure. But it still supports the 
notion that political attitudes are generally connected to moral ones. Further evidence is 
provided by the fact that the political and legal culture of a country generally reflects its moral 
and intellectual culture. For example, the culture in Anglophone countries tends towards 
empiricism and a winner-takes-all mindset, and this is reflected in their common law tradition 
and their political system. 
It seems to me that therefore any satisfactory account of the law must explain both how the 
emergence of a legal system is a very important step that can transform a society and that it 
remains essentially connected to the moral attitudes of its members even if it is not consonant 
                                                             
2 Thanks to Miguel Garcia and Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi for prompting me to say more on this. 
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with them at every point. I want to conclude by suggesting that the best way to do this may be 
by thinking of the law itself as consisting of institutionalized, codified moral rules. Again, this 
claim is independent of where exactly we may want to draw the boundary between (non-legal) 
morality and law for certain theoretical or practical purposes and accordingly of whether we 
interpret institutions broadly so as to include all customs and traditions, or more narrowly as 
referring to organizational structures, as I did in the tripartite distinction between layers 
introduced above. In fact, it seems to me that the very fact that it is not obvious where this 
boundary should be drawn, which degree of context-independence, systematicity of 
conceptualization, codification and documentation, separation from other spheres and role 
differentiation is required for a practice to count as a proper legal system, itself supports the idea 
that law is continuous with and itself an institutionalized form of morality, similar to how science 
is continuous with common sense observation and knowledge and an institutionalized form of it. 
There is nothing magical that happens to a moral rule when it is codified and enforced by a 
sphere of specialists that completely changes its character, just like a piece of knowledge still 
remains knowledge when it becomes scientific knowledge. This is quite consistent with how the 
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